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TOWARD PROPORTIONAL DEPORTATION 
Polly J. Price∗ 
ABSTRACT 
Professor Price discusses how Professor Banks’s contribution provides an 
especially compelling illustration of the disjuncture between citizenship status 
and long-term residence in U.S. immigration law. Professor Price argues that 
Professor Banks makes a compelling case that Congress unintentionally 
created this schism and that this state of affairs need not be. 
INTRODUCTION 
With comprehensive immigration reform at a critical juncture in the United 
States, Angela Banks’s timely article reminds us of an important part of that 
debate—the deportation of noncitizens with long-term, significant ties to this 
country.1 Specifically, Banks addresses deportation on “aggravated felony” 
grounds as an overinclusive net for the public policy it was intended to serve.2 
In doing so, she has identified one of the most important and contentious issues 
in deportation policy today. 
The larger principle at issue—that citizenship is an inadequate proxy for 
membership interests in U.S. society—is well-traveled ground. Recent 
literature on this theme, much of which she cites, can be found in the 
scholarship of law professors Daniel Kanstroom,3 Hiroshi Motomura,4 and 
Linda Bosniak,5 as well as in the scholarship of history and political science 
 
 ∗ Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law; Associated Faculty, Department of History, 
Emory University. 
 1 See Angela M. Banks, The Normative and Historical Cases for Proportional Deportation, 62 EMORY 
L.J. 1243 (2013). 
 2 See id. at 1248‒50, 1287‒88.  
 3 See DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 243 (2007). 
 4 See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND 
CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 195‒97 (2006). 
 5 See LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP 3 
(2006). 
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professors Linda Kerber6 and Ayelet Schachar.7 The debate over birthright 
citizenship in the United States is premised upon the “arbitrary” nature of 
ascriptive rules: should full membership rights be based solely on the ground 
of territorial birth? And the concept of jus nexi has been well-developed both 
in U.S. and international scholarship.8 The notion that ties to the United 
States—and not formal citizenship—has been recognized in some contexts by 
the U.S. Supreme Court.9 
Banks’s contribution, however, provides an especially compelling 
illustration of the disjuncture between citizenship status and long-term 
residence in U.S. immigration law. Banks elucidates the expansion of crimes 
encompassed by the federal aggravated felony deportation ground, as well as 
the removal of discretion at nearly all levels of the deportation process.10 
Banks acknowledges the administrative concerns favoring a speedy, 
predictable response to violent crimes committed by recent arrivals, 
particularly those who entered the country surreptitiously. But “green card” 
holders and long-term residents, she argues, deserve better. This is especially 
true for any noncitizen with significant community ties. Families are left 
destitute and U.S. citizen children lose critical parental support, often for a 
one-off, nonviolent crime committed and punished years ago. 
This state of affairs need not be, and Banks makes a compelling case that 
Congress unintentionally created it. Banks’s exploration of the legislative 
history of deportation on criminal grounds is an impressive contribution: we 
see that the United States has followed different policies in the past, with 
arguably more success as a deterrent to crime, and certainly with more 
fairness. We also see that Congress’s 1996 foray into deportation strategy—
and particularly, the aggravated felony expansions—exhibited substantial 
confusion about the effect on green card holders and other long-term 
 
 6 See generally, e.g., Linda K. Kerber, Presidential Address, The Stateless as the Citizen’s Other: A 
View from the United States, 112 AM. HIST. REV. 1 (2007) (examining the interplay between statelessness and 
citizenship). 
 7 See generally AYELET SCHACHAR, THE BIRTHRIGHT LOTTERY: CITIZENSHIP AND GLOBAL INEQUALITY 
112 (2009) (arguing that the basis for citizenship is neither birth in a particular territory nor “descent from a 
member parent,” but, instead, “stems from being a participant in the relevant bounded membership 
community”). 
 8 See id. at 16. See generally RE-IMAGINING POLITICAL COMMUNITY: STUDIES IN COSMOPOLITAN 
DEMOCRACY (Daniele Archibugi et al. eds., 1998) (collecting essays on national sovereignty, concepts of 
membership, and the response of political institutions to globalization). 
 9 See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982). 
 10 See Banks, supra note 1, at 1251, 1281‒82, 1287. 
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residents.11 Subsequent efforts to ameliorate this effect have gained no traction, 
Banks notes, because legislators generally fear the “soft on crime” label. It is 
always difficult to roll back criminal sanctions, especially in the midst of a 
highly charged debate over illegal immigration. 
Banks’s article is thought provoking and leads to further questions and 
challenges for U.S. immigration policy. I would like to raise three such 
questions, in abbreviated form. I do not provide answers because the issues I 
identify are sufficiently complex to warrant separate analysis. Nonetheless, I 
believe these questions both highlight the important contributions of Banks’s 
article and underscore its further implications. 
I. WHAT ARE THE BEST STRATEGIES TO FIX THE PROBLEM? 
Banks advocates a statutory approach that would provide concrete criteria 
to determine which noncitizens should be allowed to stay when facing 
deportation for a post-entry crime. She admits that this approach would require 
“complex” rules enacted by Congress, not formulated in her article.12 
Distributional fairness may require such categorical complexity if a 
discretionary approach—standards rather than rules—permits unacceptable 
variation in deportation decisions. But perhaps other strategies might further 
her goal? Prosecutorial discretion in selecting whom to deport gets little 
attention in the article, but rules directing prosecutors to account for residential 
ties could perhaps provide the outcome Banks seeks without requiring 
Congress to act. This approach, of course, depends upon the will of the 
Executive, and would likely be viewed by some members of Congress as 
unacceptable executive action (similar to the reaction of some members of 
Congress to President Obama’s implementation of deferred action for 
childhood arrivals as a matter of prosecutorial discretion). 
Another approach might be to restore the discretion formerly held by 
immigration law judges, if not the federal judiciary. Banks cites the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines as a model for the complex rules to be enshrined by 
statute, but the Guidelines, too, have long been criticized for one-size-fits-all 
 
 11 In 1996, Congress enacted both the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (frequently referred to as IIRIRA). See 
Banks, supra note 1, at 1279. 
 12 Banks states, “Complex rule-like directives could be used to achieve this goal. Congress could create a 
system like the Federal Sentencing Guidelines that takes account of a variety of factors in determining an 
individual’s punishment.” Banks, supra note 1, at 1303. 
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punishment, when in some circumstances judges see the need for an 
individualized approach.13 The Guidelines have eroded in favor of greater 
judicial control over individualized sentencing. It might be possible to tap into 
this more general devolution for criminal sentencing as an argument equally 
applicable to deportation proceedings. 
Finally, are there any significant prospects for a successful constitutional 
challenge to automatic deportation for an aggravated felony? It is true, as 
Banks notes, that the long-standing “deportation is not punishment” refrain is 
still the reigning paradigm. On the other hand, some judges and even the 
Supreme Court have recently expressed discomfort with this nineteenth-
century declaration.14 Banks’s hypothetical case of “Gerardo,” reflected in 
many real-life instances, might present a compelling opportunity to rid the law 
of this categorical distinction. 
II. SHOULD WE CONSIDER DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS OF U.S. DEPORTATION 
DECISIONS ON OTHER NATIONS? 
Some nations on the receiving end of U.S. deportations, primarily in 
Central America, maintain that U.S. deportation practices have led to 
substantial increase in drug- and gang-related violent crime in their countries.15 
There is ample reason to believe this is true.16 But should this be a 
consideration for the U.S. government? After all, dangerous criminals make 
the paradigm case for aggravated felony exclusions. We make our country 
safer when we expel such persons. 
The end game of deportation is to expel a person to his or her country of 
origin.17 For the receiving nation, this outcome is arbitrary if the deportee has 
little or no connection to the country of his or her nationality. On the other 
 
 13 See id. at n.350. 
 14 See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010); H. Lee Sarokin, Debunking the Myth That 
Deportation Is Not Punishment, HUFFINGTONPOST.COM (Oct. 14, 2009, 4:44 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost. 
com/judge-h-lee-sarokin/debunking-the-myth-that-d_b_321329.html.  
 15 See Steven Dudley, Part II: Gangs, Deportation, and Violence in Central America, 
INSIGHTCRIME.ORG (Nov. 26, 2012), http://www.insightcrime.org/violence-against-migrants/part-ii-gangs-
deportation-and-violence-in-central-america.  
 16 See MICHAEL SHIFTER, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, COUNTERING CRIMINAL VIOLENCE IN 
CENTRAL AMERICA, at vii, 7, 9, 21–22, 29 (2012), http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/Criminal_ 
Violence_CSR643.pdf.  
 17 In some instances, deportation cannot occur because nationality cannot be determined or no country is 
willing to receive the deportee. Polly J. Price, Stateless in the United States: Current Reality and a Future 
Prediction, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 443, 472 (2013). 
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hand, the return of an adult criminal who only recently left that country can be 
more easily justified. Long-term U.S. residents deported on aggravated felony 
grounds arguably developed a propensity for violence or drug use in this 
country. Rather than punish and reform these individuals, the United States 
prefers to export its own crime problem. Citizenship and nationality, absent the 
jus nexi principle advocated by Banks, is underinclusive in this way as well. 
A related question follows from the banishment of violent criminals to a 
country with which they have no ties. State governments object to the expense 
of imprisoning noncitizens, particularly those with no legal permission to be in 
the United States. From this perspective, state and local governments prefer 
immediate deportation after a conviction, thus avoiding the significant cost of 
incarceration. But this also substitutes society’s traditional “punishment” for 
the crime in favor of the “punishment” of deportation. If this result applied 
only to noncitizens with no substantial ties here, would that be an acceptable 
trade-off for implementing the rules Banks advocates? Crime victims might 
disagree, especially if the deportee finds an illicit way back. 
III. IF THE UNITED STATES EASES ITS “WAR ON DRUGS,” SHOULDN’T THAT BE 
REFLECTED IN IMMIGRATION LAW? 
Finally, Banks’s article invites broader reflection on America’s “war on 
drugs.” It is no coincidence that Congress imposed near-automatic deportation 
for drug crimes in the same era that it created inflexible and harsh federal 
sentences—including the death penalty—for certain drug crimes.18 The U.S. 
prison population is notoriously large, and a high proportion of inmates are 
there because of drug crimes.19 Drug crimes, in turn, have been the centerpiece 
for deportation on aggravated felony grounds. 
Recently, however, politicians readily admit that there are disparities and 
other problems with harsh sentencing for drug crimes, and, in some instances. 
they have attempted to ameliorate these problems. The Fair Sentencing Act of 
2010, for example, reduced the disparity in sentencing between crack and 
powder cocaine.20 A recent CNN report labeled the war on drugs “a trillion-
 
 18 The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, for example, included the death 
penalty for large-scale drug trafficking. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act 
of 1994, NCJRS.GOV (Oct. 24, 1994), https://www.ncjrs.gov/txtfiles/billfs.txt.  
 19 See Adam Liptak, U.S. Prison Population Dwarfs That of Other Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/23/world/americas/23iht-23prison.12253738.html?pagewanted=all.  
 20 Fair Sentencing Act, ACLU.ORG, https://www.aclu.org/fair-sentencing-act (last visited May 15, 2014).  
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dollar failure.”21 The governors of Georgia22 and New Jersey,23 among other 
states, have expressed the desire to lessen the prison sentence for those 
convicted of what are increasingly viewed to be minor drug offenses. The 
potential legalization of marijuana use would also contrast sharply with 
marijuana-related deportations. 
Will different priorities in the war on drugs also be reflected in immigration 
law? Logically, they should be. In Banks’s hypothetical, Gerardo’s $10 bag of 
marijuana led to deportation. If minor drug offenses cease to count as 
aggravated felonies for deportation, we would at least be one step closer to 
proportional deportation. 
CONCLUSION 
Many of the questions briefly explored here are beyond the scope of what 
Banks set out to do in her article. This Essay is thus not in the nature of a 
traditional criticism, but instead points out ways in which Banks’s article 
inspires further practical implications and alternative frameworks. Legal 
scholarship is at its best when it identifies and describes a significant problem 
and proposes workable solutions. It is even better when, as here, an article 
invites reflection on a wider range of policy concerns and provides the 
historical context necessary to tackle them. 
 
 
 21 Richard Branson, War on Drugs a Trillion-Dollar Failure, CNN.COM (Dec. 7, 2012, 6:05 PM), http:// 
www.cnn.com/2012/12/06/opinion/branson-end-war-on-drugs/.  
 22 See Jim Galloway, A New Governor Looks Behind Georgia’s Prison Bars to Save Money, AJC.COM 
(Jan. 15, 2011, 3:00 PM), http://blogs.ajc.com/political-insider-jim-galloway/2011/01/15/a-new-governor-
looks-behind-georgias-prison-bars-to-save-money/.  
 23 See Reihan Salam, Chris Christie and the “Failed War on Drugs,” REUTERS.COM (Jan. 24, 2014), 
http://blogs.reuters.com/reihan-salam/2014/01/24/chris-christie-and-the-failed-war-on-drugs/.  
